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Studie
Burma: Drug Control Progress and Possibilities
Jenna Dawson and Daniel Barlow
Abstract
Burma is the second largest opium producer in the world, and is quickly becoming a hotbed
of methamphetamine production. Opium profits have helped to finance conflict within
Burma for both the central government and the insurgent ethnic groups; however, with
the 1989 ceasefire agreements with the insurgent ethnic groups the drug control context
changed dramatically. In April 2002, the Kokang and Wa ethnic leaders, whose regions
account for the vast majority of opium poppy cultivation, committed to making their
territory opium-free by 2003 and July 2005 respectively.
The combined drug control efforts of national and local leaders have shown promis-
ing results, as both UN and US opium surveys have confirmed large declines in poppy
cultivation. As Burma continues to reduce opium cultivation, it has struggled in recent
years with an increase in the production of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Com-
bating the threats from opium and ATS will require different strategies. Stronger border
controls, improved law enforcement and interdiction techniques must complement de-
velopment strategies and alternative cropping policies. (manuscript received 31.5.2005,
accepted 24.6.2005)
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Studie
Myanmar: Strategien zur Drogenkontrolle
Jenna Dawson und Daniel Barlow
Abstract
Myanmar ist der zweitgrößte Opiumproduzent der Welt und hat sich zu einer Hochburg
der Methamphetaminproduktion entwickelt. Die Gewinne aus der Opiumproduktion
halfen sowohl der Zentralregierung als auch den aufständischen ethnischen Gruppen, den
Konflikt zu finanzieren. Seit denWaffenstillstandsvereinbarungen 1989 hat sich der Kontext
der Drogenkontrolle dramatisch verändert. Im April 2002 versprachen die Führer der
Kokang und derWa, in deren Einflussbereich die überwältigende Mehrheit des Mohnanbaus
und der Opiumproduktion stattfindet, ihre Gebiete bis 2003 bzw. 2005 opiumfrei zu
bekommen.
Die vereinten Anstrengungen nationaler und lokaler Führer bei der Bekämpfung der
Drogenproduktion zeigt viel versprechende Ergebnisse; sowohl die Statistiken der UN als
auch der USA bestätigten einen starken Rückgang des Opiumanbaus. Während Burma
den Anbau von Opium reduziert, erlebte es in den vergangenen Jahren einen Anstieg
der Produktion der Amphetamin-Derivate (ATS). Stärkere Grenzkontrollen, verbesserte
Rechtsetzung und Untersuchungstechniken müssen die Entwicklung dieser Strategien
komplementär ergänzen. (Eingang des Manuskripts 31.5.2005; angenommen 24.6.2005)
Key Words: Burma, Drugs, Regional Security
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Introduction
The Union of Myanmar, as Burma1 is now known, is a study of an isolated
country that is desperately seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the world. The
ruling military junta has given autonomy to several of the ethnic groups that led
insurgencies against the government, and together with these ethnic minorities
has vowed to crack down on the drug production that runs rampant throughout
the Union. Burma, the second largest opium producer in the world, is also
quickly becoming a hotbed of methamphetamine production. However, in the
last 15 years, mutually reinforcing international, regional and national goals have
dramatically changed the drug control policies and possibilities in Burma. While it
is commonly reported that political, social and economic conditions in Burma are
only deteriorating, we would argue that there has been significant progress in the
context of drug control. This issue brief details the background of drug control
in Burma, both the opium and amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) situations,
and will discuss how the face of drug production in Burma has changed over the
last few years. Finally, several recommendations and a brief discussion of the
alternative development projects in the country will be presented.
1 Background: The History of Drug Control in Burma
The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), the predecessor
to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), began activities in Burma
in 1976 (for further information see Lintner 1994). Over the next twelve years,
UNFDAC, in collaboration with other UN agencies, initiated a national drug
control program that included agriculture-related activities, preventative education,
public information, treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. The main emphasis,
however, was on law enforcement, narcotics suppression and eradication. Despite
UN efforts and bilateral assistance from the US, the opium poppy eradication
campaign was only moderately successful. The border areas in which opium
cultivation was concentrated were highly contested, and experienced frequent
incidents of armed violence as well as military operations. Opium profits financed
the conflict for both the central government and the insurgent ethnic groups, and
1 Please note that the geographic names “Myanmar“, “Union of Myanmar“ and “Burma“ will be used
interchangeably throughout this paper.
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allegiances could be bought and sold for the lucrative income from the sale of
narcotics.
The drug control context changed with the military hand-over in 1988. The
new junta government sought to establish its legitimacy by bringing stability to
the re-named “Union of Myanmar“, and to this end pursued ceasefire agreements
with the insurgent ethnic groups. From 1988 to 1996, the junta signed 17 cease-
fire agreements with the various insurgents, granting them differing degrees of
autonomy and self-governance over certain areas of the country. Initially, the
ceasefires led to an increase in opium cultivation in the autonomous regions as the
newly autonomous groups sought drug profits to help administer their regions.
As the ethnic minorities became more integrated into the Union, however, the
government was able to assert some degree of control over a policy of phasing
out opium production. The first tangible result of this turn of events was the
surrender of notorious drug lord Khun Sa and his Mong Tai Army to government
forces in 1996.
In April 2002, the Kokang and Wa ethnic leaders, whose regions account
for the vast majority of opium poppy cultivation, reiterated their commitment
to making their territory opium-free by 2003 and July 2005 respectively. This
commitment was made as part of a larger 15-year plan instituted by the junta
in 1999 to make Myanmar opium-free by 2014. Thus far, the combined drug
control efforts of national and local leaders have shown promising results, as
both UN and US opium surveys have confirmed a spectacular decline in opium
poppy cultivation since 1996. The opium challenge for the coming years will be
to maintain the phase-out policy while ensuring its sustainability by providing
poppy farmers with alternative sources of income and enhanced development
opportunities.
As Myanmar continues its encouraging progress on reducing opium culti-
vation, it has struggled in recent years with an increase in the production of
amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). While ATS production bears some resem-
blance to the opium trade by taking advantage of Myanmar’s porous borders, both
to import the necessary precursor chemicals and to export the finished product, it
is not replacing the income lost by poor farmers through the opium eradication
effort. ATS can be produced in simple, mobile laboratories, but its production
requires chemicals, water, electricity and knowledge that Myanmar’s poor farmers
do not possess.
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As such, combating the threats from opium and ATS will require different
strategies. Stronger border controls, improved law enforcement and interdiction
techniques must complement development strategies and alternative cropping
policies. Recommendations along these lines will be discussed later in the brief.
2 Opium Production
Burmese opium cultivation began in the 18th century, and commercial exploita-
tion of the crop began when the British colonized Burma. As the northeastern
parts of Burma are ethnically diverse and geographically difficult to reach, it was
difficult to produce and transport marketable goods. Opium was one of the only
cash crops that were viable in the area. The “cultivation was restricted to some
remote hill areas east of the Salween River: Kokang, a district dominated by ethnic
Chinese, and the Wa Hills“ (Lintner 2000: 5). By the 1950s, opium production
in Burma yielded 300-600 tons, a 20% increase from the years prior to WWII
(Lintner 2000: 8). Approximately 90% of Myanmar’s opium is grown in the Shan
state (for further information on where the illegal poppy cultivation areas are,
please see Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control), and the profits fuelled
warfare between the ethnic minorities and the central government in the capital
city, Rangoon (Yangon).
The ceasefire between the Wa and the ruling junta came into effect in 1989,
and by 1996 opium cultivation in the autonomous areas skyrocketed to its peak of
163,000 ha (US Department of State 2004). As part of the drug control efforts in
the country, the US government has conducted a yield survey on an annual basis
since 1993, and the UN has conducted one since 2002. Critics of the Burmese
regime have argued that these surveys do not take into account the “balloon
effect“ and that they rely too heavily on government-provided information. As a
means of addressing this criticism, the UNODC has conducted assessments across
Burmese territory to ensure that opium production has not simply moved outside
the Shan state.
In 1999, the Myanmar military government, in conjunction with the Wa
Authority and the decision by ASEAN to make the region drug-free by 2015,
developed a plan to end opium production in the country by 2014. The plan seems
to be working, as by early 2004, poppy cultivation was 44,200 ha, down 73% from
the peak in 1996 (UNODC 2004: 3). There are many converging reasons for this
decline. On the international agenda, what happens within Myanmar fits within
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the larger global context of the 1988 UN Convention, the ASEAN agreement,
and the military junta’s desperate quest for legitimacy. Regionally, Southeast
Asia is entering a new era and turning its back on its history of instability,
cross-border plundering, and financing of the proxy armies that operate in the
lawless border areas of Myanmar for both ideological and profit-driven reasons.
If Myanmar wants to be a part of the region, it must demonstrate progress in
strategic areas, particularly in curbing opium production. Domestically, the
military junta benefits from drug control, as drugs have always been one of the
primary means for continuing instability and conflict. “Purging drugs out of
the country definitely furthers the domestic agenda of reconciliation“ (Lemahieu
2004).2 Thus the international, regional and domestic agendas are mutually
reinforcing one another, resulting in the reduction in poppy cultivation in Burma.
However, Burma remains the second largest opium producer in the world.
Cultivation of opium poppy is intimately intertwined with the extreme poverty
in the country, as the poppy is grown primarily to generate cash to offset food
deficits and to purchase basic needs such as clothing and medicine. Due to the
lack of health care supplies and infrastructure, opium is widely used for medicinal
purposes, including the treatment of malaria and diarrhea. As such, medicinal use
fuels addiction among the local population.
The government continues to address the problem in a traditional, top-down
manner. The government strategy is designed to gradually eliminate poppy cultiva-
tion by increasing the standard of living in the border regions through a program
of improved accessibility and communication in addition to the provision of in-
come-generating crops. The implementation began with large-scale infrastructure
projects which included road and bridge construction, energy generation, and
factory assembly and construction. Much of this approach to opium-reduction
has been implemented via strict deadlines and the mandating of policies from the
top down with authoritarian methods of enforcing them.
In addition to these projects, the Kokang and Wa Authorities have used
unorthodox methods to eradicate the poppy crop, including forced relocation.
The ethnic leadership has relocated entire highland villages to more economically
prosperous lowland areas, which provide the relocated population with land to
2 This and other interviews were conducted during an internship with UN in Myanmar, and we
would like to thank all of the contributions that made this paper possible. We would also like to
state that while this information was collected from the UN and other sources, it does not reflect
the official position of the United Nations.
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farm and housing opportunities. The UN and other humanitarian organizations
in Burma have opposed these efforts because of their ill effects on the population,
but they have nonetheless contributed to the reduction in poppy cultivation.
While recent reductions in opium production are welcome from the per-
spective of drug control efforts, attention must be paid to the humanitarian
consequences of the rapid decline in poppy cultivation. The UNODC 2004 Myan-
mar Opium Survey has shown that 260,000 households3 in Burma are engaged
in opium cultivation, with the average opium farming household’s total annual
income around US$ 214, with 62% of this amount derived from poppy cultiva-
tion. The Survey also shows that families relying on poppy cultivation have a
lower income that non-opium farming households (UNODC 2004: 2), further
demonstrating that opium is truly a crop of last resort for the poorest of the poor
farmers.
Providing economic opportunities for opium-growing households is impera-
tive to ensuring the sustainability of the current opium-reduction strategy. UN-
ODC and its partners in the Kokang and Wa Initiative (KOWI) have taken a
broader, more holistic approach to supply reduction, by using a multi-sectoral ap-
proach to increase food security, improve access to essential services such as health
and education, and provide further income-generating opportunities rather than
simple crop substitution. UNODC Representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu cautions
that the rapid reductions in opium crop are not sustainable without the provision
of alternative livelihoods for the farmers in the border regions. As the opium
cultivation decreases, the average farmgate price for opium in Burma has increased
to US$ 234 per kilogram, an 80% increase over 2003 prices (UNODC 2004: 4).
With this increased farmgate price, greater incentive for farmers to cultivate opium
poppy may not be far behind.
3 Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) Production
While the Burmese government and the Wa Authority are cracking down on
opium poppy production, methamphetamines have become the hot new narcotic
of the criminal elements in the opium chain. ATS tablets are cheaper to produce,
require no plant base, are easier to smuggle and market than heroin, and large
quantities of the so-called yaa baa4 or “crazy medicine“ are rivaling the traditional
3 The average household size is 5 people (UNODC 2004: 2).
4 Yaa baa may also be spelled as ya ba.
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trade in opiates (Chouvy/Meissonnier 2002). In the mid-1990s, when the drug
producers diversified into methamphetamine production, a mere trickle of these
pills was reaching Thailand, the primary market for this drug. Today it is a
torrential overflow, as demand for yaa baa in Thailand and China has exploded
over the past two years.
Thai officials, along with UN and US anti-narcotics agents, have estimated
that 800 million to one billion pills are produced in Burma on an annual basis,
with production becoming increasingly sophisticated. Some labs can turn out 50
million pills a year (Chouvy 2004).
Until recently, most of this was produced in mobile laboratories along Myan-
mar’s border with Thailand [...] some of these have moved inland [...] and
over the past two years there has also been a migration of mobile factories up
to the border with Laos (Jagan 2004a).5
US intelligence sources believe that the majority of mobile methamphetamine
labs are located near the Laotian border, with some being established across
the border. According to Jeremy Milsom of the UNODC country office in
Burma, the production is not limited to the Shan state area and that location
choice likely has more to do with “loose border controls in an area that is close
to Thailand and China, which are the major destination countries as well as
the sources for the necessary precursor chemicals“ (Milsom 2004).6 Thus from
a strictly geo-economic viewpoint, combating methamphetamine production
requires radical new logistics as the factors of production for ATS are no longer
tied to a particular territory.7
Thai military officials contend that most of the yaa baa from Burma is pro-
duced by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the United States view this
organization as one of the world’s largest and best-armed drug-dealing organi-
zations. Drug experts have estimated that it costs the producer approximately
5 It should also be noted that the Wa territory does not share a border with Thailand.
6 According to Nikolas Win Myint, Press Information and Analysis Unit, UNODC Myanmar
Country Office, Burma does not possess the internal infrastructure to produce the necessary
precursors for ATS. He suggests that the chemicals are trafficked in through the same channels
through which ATS is trafficked out, via porous borders in the remote regions of the country that
severely lack law enforcement capabilities (Personal Interview, 24 November 2004).
7 Translated from the French “induit des logiques radicalement nouvelles puisque les facteurs de
production ne sont pas lies à un terroir particulier“ (Chouvy/Meissonnier 2002: 54).
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5 cents to make a yaa baa pill.8 They sell it for 30 cents to Thai intermediaries,
and by the time the crazy medicine reaches the streets of Bangkok, it can sell
for as much as US$ 2 a pill. This is a much higher return on investment than
can be achieved with heroin production (Wechsler 2004). The drug gangs have
devoted their business to yaa baa production in order to supplement their reduced
profits from decreased heroin sales, and to satisfy the growing number of addicts
in Thailand who cannot afford the expensive heroin.
Former spokesman for the Burmese government, Lt. Col. Hla Min, has said
that on the whole, the UWSA is not involved in methamphetamine production
and that the Thai estimate of 800 million pills being smuggled across the border is
“overblown“ (Jagan 2004a). According to Wa leader Bao Yuxiang, the Wa does
“not tolerate the production of synthetic drugs in areas under our control“ (Jagan
2004b). One thing the Thai government, the Wa leaders and Myanmar’s junta do
agree on is that criminal gangs are behind the production and trafficking of the
crazy medicine. Many argue that it is primarily Chinese criminal elements with
connections to Hong Kong and Macau that are behind ATS production. While it
is unknown who is responsible for ATS production in Burma, one aspect the UN
and other aid agencies are certain of is that few, if any, opium farmers are involved
in the manufacture of yaa baa, as the production process requires access to capital
that they do not have: clean water sources, chemicals, electricity, expertise, and
access to markets (Win Myint 2004).
About 80 tons9 of yaa baa are smuggled into Thailand from Burma every year,
mostly overland, in convoys of seven to ten couriers who often travel with heavily
armed escorts and backpacks filled with 200,000 pills apiece.
Ya ba tablets marked with the UWSA brands ’99’ and ’WY’ are packed in
plastic bags and forced down the throats of cows before crossing the border
from Karenni State to Thailand’s Mae Hong Son province, where the cows
will be killed and the bags retrieved (Wechsler 2004).
The use of cows and buffalo is widespread along the Thai-Burmese border, but
cars, boats and planes, as well as riders on horseback are common as well. Pills are
concealed in tinned food, bamboo, timber, fish, or packed in sacks of garlic or tea.
8 Demand for ATS in Myanmar itself is low, and yaa baa pills sell for as little as 15 cents in the
country.
9 80 tons is approximately equivalent to the estimated 800 million–one billion yaa baa pills trafficked
into Thailand on an annual basis.
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While some of the pills are shipped to other Asian countries, Australia, Europe and
the United States, most remain in Thailand where the use of methamphetamines
has skyrocketed among teenagers and young adults. The abundance of crazy
medicine has provided people who could never afford heroin with a quick, cheap
high. Students take it as an inexpensive replacement for Ecstasy at dance clubs,
as the pills give users a feeling of hyper-alertness. Millions of poor labourers in
Thailand use cheap yaa baa, which often costs as little as US$ 1 per pill, to help
them stay awake, and alarming stories have surfaced of farmers paying seasonal
labourers with yaa baa (Wechsler 2004).
In Burma, however, there is no recent evidence of increased ATS production.
As measured by seizure statistics, there is an indication of a decline of 88% from
2001 to 2003 (Asia Pacific Amphetamine Type Stimulant Information Center 2004).
It is particularly important to interpret these statistics with caution, however, as
they may be a result of fewer seizures instead of less production. The seizure
data indicates a continuing decline, with 2.01 million yaa baa tablets seized in the
first six months of 2004, and only one clandestine ATS laboratory destroyed by
law enforcement in 2003 (Asia Pacific Amphetamine Type Stimulant Information
Center 2004).
While Burma’s ruling junta and the UWSA appear to be taking concerted
steps to eradicate opium poppy cultivation, they appear to be far less rigorous in
eliminating the production of methamphetamines. It must be noted, however, that
the Wa and the junta receive far less assistance in combating the ATS problem than
they do with opium eradication. The international community appears willing to
contribute to fighting poppy production as they see the humanitarian aspects of
its elimination. Combating ATS is predominantly a law enforcement issue, and
assistance is less likely due to its highly politically-sensitive nature. Nonetheless,
it is clear that Myanmar does not possess the law enforcement capacity to fight
this problem on its own.
4 Why the Changing Face of Drug Production?
There appears to be a shift in Burmese drug production from opium poppy
cultivation to methamphetamine production. Both the military junta and the
leadership of the Wa are seeking international legitimacy for their governance,
and realize that they need to clamp down on the production of opium in order
to achieve this goal. Opium is still regarded as a greater threat to international
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security and public health than is methamphetamine. Additionally, opium has
only served to continue the cycle of poverty in the border regions, and has
led to widespread addiction problems, both of which threaten the domestic
agendas of the junta and the autonomous ethnic leadership. The ethnic Wa
and Kokang leaders have profited from the opium trade, and have begun to
invest in legitimate Burmese enterprises as part of their quest for legitimacy and
international recognition. As part of their concessions during the ceasefires,
the ethnic leaders were given mines and other businesses with the intention of
integrating them into the Burmese economy. “The key of this policy is that the
ethnic minority groups become anchored within the Union“ (Lemahieu 2004).
These leaders must now consider Yangon before they make decisions, since they
risk losing or harming their valuable investments withing the legitimate Burmese
economy.
The leaders appear to genuinely want to improve the livelihoods of their
people, as they have seen the living standards of the neighbouring Chinese increase
by leaps and bounds and are seeking similar achievements. Wa Authority leader,
Chairman Bau Yuxiang has invested in the construction of local cigarette factories,
hydroelectric power plants, a tin smelting plant, and large-scale rubber plantations
in hopes of generating income for the people of his region, as well as for himself.
All of these efforts are designed to improve his image among the people, which
will in turn increase his hold on power (Wa Alternative Development Project
Staff 2004).
In terms of ATS, the pills are easier to transport, cheaper to produce and
the end markets much closer than for opiates, with the majority going to fuel
Thailand’s enormous demand. Burma’s proximity to China and India facilitates
the precursor chemical traffic into the border regions, and since the borders are
porous and corruption rampant, Burma is a popular place for criminal syndicates
to operate without repercussion. Evidence points to organized crime connections
with Chinese traffickers in Hong Kong and Macau as fueling the ATS production
in the lawless border regions, and mobile laboratories can easily escape detec-
tion. Smuggling syndicates on both sides of the Burma-Bangladesh border have
recently stepped up their operations, and “WY“ drug tablets are flooding into
Bangladesh at an unprecedented rate due to the lack of cooperation between
Burma and Bangladesh on repression of smuggling along the common porous
borders (Kaladan News 2004).
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5 Recommendations
Any successful drug policy requires efforts on both sides of the same coin: repres-
sion of the criminal elements, and sustainable livelihoods for the opium farmers.
While Burma is plagued by internal instability and must deal with thousands
of kilometers of porous borders, the emphasis of drug control policy has unfor-
tunately focused on repression rather than on sustainable development. As the
regional and international legal frameworks clearly indicate, no country should
be left alone to deal with drug control.
Regionally, the convergence of interests in controlling narcotics necessitates
regional, cross-border cooperation that was impossible only a decade ago when
neighbouring countries or business interests supported the proxy armies within
Myanmar. There has been progress since the ministerial Beijing Declaration in
June 2001, and intelligence exchange, precursor chemical control and even joint
border operations may be pursued within the context of shared regional interest.
For example, Thailand has proposed the “setting up of 10 more border liaison
offices in the four Mekong countries and an increase in the frequency of patrols
along the Mekong River in a bid to stem the flow of illicit drugs“ (Chuennian
2004).
Thailand’s strict drug suppression drive in northeastern Burma has forced
drug gangs to switch their smuggling routes, and more border offices will help to
clamp down on the smuggling. The drug business booms in the hands of those
who loathe transparency and swear by instability and lawlessness. “Keeping the
status quo of ethnic warfare and unrecorded cross-border trade might be the best
guarantee of going unpunished“ (Lemahieu 2004). It is thus imperative that law
enforcement and border control be improved in the border areas where criminal
syndicates thrive.
In terms of alternative development, “Myanmar’s war on drugs has impov-
erished thousands of former opium-growing farmers who cannot sell their cash
crops due to curbs imposed by the military junta“ (Reuters 2004). While it must
be noted that these farmers have always been poor, the ban on opium production
has further exacerbated their dire economic situation. For farmers forced to
stop growing opium, the switch to cash crops has slashed incomes by almost
70% due to restrictions on movement that prevent their goods from reaching the
market. Sheila Sisulu, deputy executive director of the World Food Programme,
has questioned the “point of these people being assisted to grow cash crops if
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they do not have market access?“ (Reuters 2004). Market access for alternative
crops must be assured, as well as freedom of movement and transit for farmers to
transport and sell their crops at market.
The local people fear for their future, as the poppies they have cultivated for
hundreds of years were their hedge against the chronic food shortages in Burma.
Chairman Bau, leader of the ethnic Wa, has suggested that new techniques such
as irrigation, different crops and new seeds, will help change the habits of the
former opium farmers. “Its good for them and it’s in the interest of the whole
people“ (Jagan 2004a). For the Wa’s relocation programs, the people are moved
from “infertile highland areas where poppy is one of the few crops that can be
grown successfully to lower, more fertile ground where rice cultivation and fruit
trees flourish“ (Jagan 2004b). While the Wa leaders concede that mass population
movements and the ban on poppy cultivation will cause extreme hardship for the
Wa people in the short run, the leadership acknowledges that it will have to give
up poppy cultivation in order to preserve its political and economic autonomy to
pursue a Wa state within the Union of Myanmar.
According to the 15 year drug elimination plan, three methods will be used to
put an end to opium cultivation: (1) improving the socio-economic conditions of
the border areas, (2) “for the producer and abuser of narcotic drugs to enlighten
their belief, conviction and their psychological make-up for the better“ (Central
Committee for Drug Abuse Control: 3), and (3) to increase accessibility and
communications between ethnic groups living in the highlands and those in the
rest of the country. Community development is the cornerstone of the plan. Each
participating village should have input into their own development, giving them
both a sense of involvement and ownership in the process. Microcredit lending
programs would also benefit the community projects, creating sustainable develop-
ment possibilities for participants. Another way of improving the socio-economic
conditions is through infrastructure development that will provide access to vil-
lages by automobile, which will also facilitate market access and communications
amongst the population.
Construction of schools, clinics and other community buildings will greatly
enhance the potential for development and education of the local population.
Education-for-food programs would be an appropriate incentive for sending chil-
dren to school. “Improving on the 90 percent illiteracy rate is key to helping
farmers become independent of poppy“ (Wa Alternative Development Project
Staff 2004). Having access to medical care will reduce the demand for opiates that
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serve as alternatives to health care, and by training village health volunteers, both
livelihood sustainability and vocational training will be promoted. Treatment and
detoxification centers are also crucial tools to combat the demand side of drug
control.
In addition, exposing the leaders of the ethnic groups and the military junta
to international standards and values would reduce the danger inherent in putting
political reform solely in the light of democracy (the opposition, including the
ethnic groups) versus dictatorship (the junta in Yangon). “Exposing the ethnic
groups, through a persistent international presence, to more universal values and
governance will promote a political reform agenda“ (Lemahieu 2004), that may
help alleviate the drug problems without the need for repressive drug control
policies, forced relocations and humanitarian crisis.
If the international community is serious about drug control, wants to pro-
mote regional conflict management and prevention, is concerned about political
reform in Myanmar and wants to avoid another Afghanistan, humanitarian dis-
aster and a human rights catastrophe, then it should live up to its commitments
and responsibilities. The wider implications of drug control must be emphasized,
particularly the political, environmental, humanitarian, development and cultural
perspectives. New partners with differing fields of expertise must be cultivated to
create a broad base of support and mobilization.
Drug are less a single problem and more of a symptom of one or many
underlying social, economic and political issues. If these underlying causes
cannot be tackled then drug control efforts might not be sustainable in the
long run (Lemahieu 2004).
6 Conclusion
While there is a long road ahead, improvement in the drug situation in Burma is
“undeniable, tangible and visible“ (Lemahieu 2004). Opium has a long and storied
history in Burma, and the ruling junta, the Wa Authority and the ASEAN region
as a whole have committed to making the country drug-free by 2014. While this
massive undertaking seems to be making progress, it has not been without cost.
Poor farmers continue to suffer while organized criminals gain from the transition
from opium to ATS production. Forced relocation programs and alternative
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development projects have not done enough to provide sustainable incomes for
those most profoundly affected by the ban on opium cropping. The reasons for
the changing face of drug production are many, and have international, regional
and domestic dimensions and agendas that must be considered when designing
and implementing development projects in Burma. Drug control cannot succeed
without development and transparency, particularly in one of the most isolated,
impoverished countries in the world.
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